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“COME NOW LET US REASON TOGETHER”: 
RESTORING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA AND ABROAD 
 




This Article challenges the criticisms of religious freedom that have emerged among 
recent academics and politicians, and the growing subordination of religious freedom to 
sexual freedom claims. In particular, we analyze recent critical scholarship that claims 
that religious liberty was not important to the American founders and that calls for the 
removal of special religious exemptions and accommodations because they are said to 
threaten other fundamental rights and to privilege religion unfairly.  These critical 
arguments we find historically false, philosophically misguided, sociologically one-sided, 
and increasingly dangerous given the perilous state of religious freedom around the 
world today.  We call for a return to the founders’ insights that religion deserves special 
constitutional protection and that religious freedom must be open to all forms of religion 
and belief.   We also call for a proper balancing of the enduring principles of freedom of 
conscience, free exercise of religion, religious pluralism, religious equality, separation of 
church and state, and disestablishment of religion, which together have helped forge the 
unique protection of religious freedom that America holds out to all its citizens, and to 
the world. 
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I.     POLITICAL CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
American religious freedom used to be “taken for granted.”  It’s now “up for grabs.”  
So writes distinguished religious liberty scholar Paul Horwitz.1  Until a generation ago, 
the opposite was true.  In 1993, a virtually unanimous Congress passed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), signed by President Clinton.2  This was a firm 
national rebuke of the 1990 Supreme Court case of Employment Division v. Smith3 that 
had greatly weakened the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause.  Four years later, the 
Court struck down the application of RFRA to the states.4  In 2000, Congress stood up 
again and passed the more targeted Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act (RLUIPA), also signed by President Clinton, a law that was binding on federal and 
state governments alike and enforceable in the federal courts.5  Twenty-one state 
legislatures eventually passed their own state religious freedom statutes, mostly 
modeled on the federal act.6  And both Congress and the states added a number of 
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 1  Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 155 (2014) (quoting Lawrence 
Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 1837, 1837 (1997)). 
 2  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993). 
 3  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
 4  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  RFRA still applies to federal laws.  See, e.g., 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (applying RFRA in a 
claim about the regulation of a Schedule I narcotic for sacramental purposes). 
 5  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 
(2000); see Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (applying RLUIPA); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 
(2005) (upholding RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge pertaining to “institutionalized 
persons”). 
 6  See Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from 
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63 (2015); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After 
Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).  Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, 
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia have RFRAs: 
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493.01 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-401 (West 
2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.01 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 73-402 (West 2016); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 35/1 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5301 
(West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5231 (2016); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 11-61-1 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.302 (West 2016); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1 (West 2016); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 251 (West 2016); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2016); 42 R.I. 
other discrete protections for religion, giving courts some of the tools they needed to 
protect religious freedom, even without a strong First Amendment.7 
So matters stood a generation ago.  But in the ensuing years, these special legislative 
protections of religious freedom have come under increasing attack.  Several states of 
late, including relatively conservative bastions like Georgia8 and Indiana,9 have buckled 
under massive lobbying and media pressure, and have scrapped or vetoed their new or 
revised RFRA plans; other states have started to limit the application of their existing 
RFRAs.10 
There are many causes for this change of legislative heart.  First, highly publicized 
religious pathologies have made it more difficult to sympathize with the cause of religion 
and religious freedom.  Particularly, the rise of Islamicism, and the horrors of 9/11, 
London’s 7/7, Fort Hood, Madrid, Paris, San Bernardino, Brussels, Orlando, Nice, and 
more have renewed traditional warnings about the dangers of religion in general and 
triggered fresh waves of “anti-Shari’a statutes”11 and harsh treatment of Muslims by 
regulators and courts.12  Leading political figures now advocate a “‘total and complete’ 
ban” on Muslims entering the United States13 and urge that the United States should “test 
every person here who is of a Muslim background, and if they believe in sharia, they 
 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 80.1-1 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-32-10 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-1-407 (West 
2016); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 57-2.02 (West 2016). 
 7  See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021 (2012); Lund, supra note 6, at 479–89. 
 8  Jim Galloway, Gearing Up for Next ‘Religious Liberty’ Fight, Georgia Business Leaders Look to 
Indiana, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Oct. 17, 2015), http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2015/10/17/gearing-up-for-next-
religious-liberty-fight-georgia-business-leaders-look-to-indiana/. 
 9  Emily Bazelon, What Are the Limits of ‘Religious Liberty’?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/magazine/what-are-the-limits-of-religious-liberty.html; Tony Cook et 
al., Indiana Governor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gay-
discrimination/70819106/; Monica Davey et al., Indiana and Arkansas Revise Rights Bills, Seeking to 
Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/indiana-
arkansas-religious-freedom-bill.html?_r=0; Amanda Holpuch, Indiana Amends Religious Freedom Bill to 
Put an End to Discrimination, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2015/apr/02/indiana-republicans-religious-freedom. 
 10  See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 871 
(2014). 
 11  For more detailed treatment and criticism of the anti-Shari’a statutes, see the discussion and 
sources in John Witte, Jr., & Joel A. Nichols, Who Governs the Family? Marriage and Divorce as a New 
Test Case of Overlapping Jurisdictions, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 321 (2013). 
 12  See LORI PEEK, BEHIND THE BACKLASH: MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11, at 16 (2011) (“In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, Muslims experienced a dramatic increase in the frequency and intensity 
of these hostile encounters.”); see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in 
the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231 (2012); Asma T. Uddin, 
American Muslims, American Islam, and the American Constitutional Heritage, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN 
AMERICA: CONSTITUTIONAL ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES 224, 224–40 (Allen D. Hertzke ed., 
2015). 
 13  Jenna Johnson & David Weigel, Donald Trump Calls for ‘Total’ Ban on Muslims Entering United 
States, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2015/12/07/e56266f6-9d2b-
11e5-8728-1af6af208198_story.html (quoting Donald Trump’s statement from December 7, 2015). 
should be deported.”14  Second, the media narrative has turned more against legislative 
protections.  For example, in 2006, The New York Times ran a sensational six-part exposé 
describing the “hundreds” of special statutory and regulatory protections, entitlements, 
and exemptions that religious individuals and groups quietly enjoy under federal, state, 
and local laws, despite all the loud lamentations about the Smith case’s truncation of 
religious freedom.15  Third, the Catholic Church was rocked by an avalanche of news 
reports and lawsuits about the pedophilia of delinquent priests and cover-ups by complicit 
bishops—all committed under the thick constitutional veil of religious autonomy.16  Fourth, 
Evangelical megachurches faced withering attacks for their massive embezzlement of 
funds, and the lush and luxurious lifestyles of their pastors—all the while enjoying tax 
exemptions for their incomes, properties, and parsonages.17 
But even bigger challenges of late have come with the new culture wars between 
religious freedom and sexual freedom.18  The legal questions for religious freedom are 
mounting.  Must a religious official with conscientious scruples marry a same-sex or 
interreligious couple?  How about a justice of the peace or a military chaplain?  Or a 
county clerk asked to give them a marriage license?19  Must devout medical doctors or 
religiously chartered hospitals perform abortions, or give assisted-reproduction 
procedures for unwed mothers, contrary to their deeply held religious beliefs about 
marriage and family life?  How about if they are receiving government funding?  Or if they 
are the only medical service available to the patient for miles around?  Must a 
conscientiously opposed pharmacist fill a prescription for a contraceptive or 
 
 14  Aaron Blake, Gingrich Says the Media Is Distorting His Plan to ‘Test’ All Muslims. But That’s What 
He Proposed, WASH. POST (July 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/07/15/newt-gingrich-says-the-media-is-overreacting-to-his-plan-to-test-all-muslims-but-thats-
what-he-proposed/?tid=a_inl (offering a transcript of Newt Gingrich’s comments from July 14, 2016). 
 15  Diana B. Henriques, In God’s Name, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8–11, 20; Nov. 23; Dec. 19, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/business/churchstate.html; see Diana B. Henriques & Andrew W. Lehren, 
Religious Groups Reap Federal Aid for Pet Projects, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/business/13lobby.html; Diana B. Henriques & Andrew W. Lehren, 
Federal Grant for a Medical Mission Goes Awry, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/business/13cutter.html. 
 16  See, e.g., John Gehring, False Choices and Religious Liberty: Is There a Better Way Forward?, 
COMMONWEAL (June 21, 2016), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/false-choices-religious-liberty; 
Amanda Holpuch, Ongoing Child Sex Abuse in Catholic Church Casts Shadow on Pope’s U.S. Visit, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/10/pope-francis-us-visit-
catholic-sex-abuse; Alexander Stille, What Pope Benedict Knew About Abuse in the Catholic Church, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-pope-benedict-knew-about-
abuse-in-the-catholic-church. 
 17  See, e.g., John Montague, The Law and Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the 
Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 203 (2013); Press Release, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, 
Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-Based Ministries (Nov. 6, 2007), 
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-seeks-information-six-media-based-
ministries. 
 18  For overviews, see RYAN T. ANDERSON, TRUTH OVERRULED: THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (2015); Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in 
Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Laycock, supra note 10. 
 19  Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky.) (ruling against a county clerk who refused to issue 
same-sex marriage licenses), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 23 (2015). 
abortifacient?20  Or a private employer carry medical insurance for the same 
prescriptions?  What if these are franchises of bigger pharmacies or employers that insist 
on these services?  May a religious organization dismiss or discipline its officials or 
members because of their sexual orientation or sexual practices, or because they had a 
divorce, abortion, or same-sex marriage?  May private religious citizens refuse to 
photograph or cater a wedding, rent an apartment, or offer a general service to a same-
sex couple whose relationship they find religiously or morally improper21—especially 
when state non-discrimination laws command otherwise?22 
These are only a few of the headline issues today, which officials and citizens are 
struggling mightily to address.  Two recent 5-4 Supreme Court cases on point have only 
exacerbated the tension.  In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010),23 sexual non-
discrimination rights trumped religious freedom claims; in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
(2014),24 religious freedom trumped reproductive freedom claims.25  The culture wars 
have only escalated as a consequence.  “Each side is intolerant of the other; each side 
wants a total win,” Douglas Laycock writes, after a thorough study of these new culture 
wars.26  “This mutual insistence on total wins is very bad for religious liberty.”27  And with 
easy political talk afoot about repealing unpopular statutes—not just the Affordable Care 
Act—legislative protections for religious freedom appear vulnerable.  Add the fact that 
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses are now much weaker protections 
than they were before the 1980s, and it is hard to resist the judgment of leading jurist 
Mary Ann Glendon that religious freedom is in danger of becoming “a second-class 
right.”28 
 
 20  See Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (involving pharmacists’ challenge to 
regulations requiring the disbursing of potential embryo-destructive medications), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2433 (2016). 
 21  See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (ruling against a photographer 
who claimed religious exemption from a state public accommodation statute with respect to same-sex 
weddings), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014). 
 22  For good overviews see FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL 
FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (2016); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Timothy Shah et al. eds., 2016); Laycock, supra note 10. 
 23  Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010). 
 24  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (finding that a for-profit company could 
assert religious liberty rights in conscientious opposition to providing certain kinds of contraceptive care to 
employees). 
 25  See also Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (responding to arguments from religious 
organizations that the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate violated RFRA because it 
required them to facilitate the provision of insurance coverage that they opposed on religious grounds, and 
deciding to vacate and remand after supplemental briefing indicated a possible functional resolution that 
would retain coverage and also respect the asserted religious rights). 
 26  Laycock, supra note 10, at 879; see also Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious 
Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231, 231–55 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter THE RISE]. 
 27  Laycock, supra note 10, at 879. 
 28  Mary Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom—A Second-Class Right?, 61 EMORY L.J. 971 (2012). 
II.     ACADEMIC CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
That’s exactly how it should be, say a number of legal scholars who have challenged 
the idea that religion is special or deserving of special constitutional or legislative 
protection.29  Even if this idea existed in the eighteenth-century founding era—and that is 
now sharply contested, too—it has become obsolete in our post-establishment, 
postmodern, and post-religious age.  Religion, these critics argue, is too dangerous, 
divisive, and diverse in its demands to be accorded special protection.30  Freedom of 
conscience claimants unfairly demand the right to be a law unto themselves, to the 
detriment of general laws and to the endangerment of other people’s fundamental rights 
and legitimate interests.  Institutional religious autonomy is too often just a special cover 
for abuses of power and forms of prejudice that should not be countenanced in any 
organization—religious or not.  Religious liberty claims are too often proxies for political 
or social agendas that deserve no more protection than any other agenda.  Religion, 
these critics thus conclude, should be viewed as just another category of liberty or 
association, with no more preference or privilege than its secular counterparts.  Religion 
should be treated as just another form of expression, subject to the same rules of rational 
democratic deliberation that govern other ideas and values.  To accord religion any 
special protection or exemption discriminates against the nonreligious.  To afford religion 
a special seat at the table of public deliberation or a special role in the implementation of 
government programs invites religious self-dealing contrary to the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause.  We cannot afford these traditional constitutional luxuries.  “The 
perils of extreme religious liberty” are now upon us.31 
University of Chicago law professor Brian Leiter is a leading exponent of such critical 
views of religious freedom.  In his widely read title, Why Tolerate Religion? (2013), this 
distinguished legal philosopher, with expertise in the iconoclast views of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, launches an iconoclastic attack on religious freedom—especially the notion 
that religious practitioners sometimes deserve exemptions from general laws that are not 
available to nonreligious citizens.  Leiter argues that “there is no apparent moral reason 
why states should carve out special protections that encourage individuals to structure 
 
 29  For a good, recent sample of arguments pro and con, see LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS 
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES: ACCOMMODATION AND ITS LIMITS (Austin Sarat ed., 2012) [hereinafter 
LEGAL RESPONSES]; THE RISE, supra note 26, at 231–55; Steven D. Smith & Larry Alexander, Introduction 
to the Symposium, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 971 (2014).  For overviews of this recent academic literature, and 
arguments for a realistic middle way, see KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN 
AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).  
 30  See e.g., LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 29; BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 63 (2013); 
Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, supra note 26; Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is 
Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012); Smith & Alexander, supra note 29. 
 31  MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2d rev. ed. 
2014); for other recent examples see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007); Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy 
of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 416, 419–21 (2016); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. 
Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 
(2015); James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 941 (2005); Elizabeth 
Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
24 (2014). 
their lives around categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of evidence 
and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute constraints on judgment and 
action.”32  Government must be studiously neutral in its devotion to “principled” toleration; 
it is “unfair,” “arbitrar[y],” impractical, and even “anarch[ic]” to give special 
accommodations, exemptions, immunities, or protections to religion or to religious claims 
of conscience.33  Doing so would be “a morally objectionable injury to the general welfare” 
and would “impose burdens on those who have no claim of exemption.”34  Indeed, Leiter 
muses whether there may be “reason to worry that religious beliefs, as against other 
matters of conscience, are far more likely to cause harms and infringe on liberty?”35  
Consider religion’s track record of late in abridging the fundamental rights of others to 
reproductive freedom, marital equality, or sexual liberty.  Or consider that “religious 
believers overwhelmingly supported George W. Bush, widely considered one of the worst 
presidents in the history of the United States, whom many think ought to be held morally 
culpable both for the illegal war of aggression against Iraq as well as the casualties 
resulting from domestic mismanagement.”36  This might well provide “the basis of an 
argument for why there are special reasons not to tolerate religion” at all—although, Leiter 
allows, that would require empirical proof that religion, on balance, does more harm than 
good.37 
University of Virginia law professor Micah Schwartzman has similarly attracted 
attention with a series of sharp law review attacks on religious exemptions and religious 
institutionalism.38  He argues that America has now come to embrace a great “diversity 
of nontheistic religious, ethical, and moral doctrines” from which religion “cannot easily be 
distinguished . . . on epistemic or psychological grounds.”39  Religious claims of 
conscience, he writes, have no more right to accommodations or exemptions than any 
other “comprehensive secular doctrine,” and for the state to give them such would be 
patently “unfair” and unwieldy and yield “inconsistenc[y]” in the application and 
enforcement of general laws.40  Moreover, free exercise religious exemptions cannot be 
viewed as a constitutional counterweight to the Establishment Clause limit on 
governmental support for religion.  Whatever the courts make of the Establishment 
Clause, the very notion that “religious convictions can serve as sufficient reasons for state 
 
 32  LEITER, supra note 30, at 63. 
 33  Id. at 94, 102. 
 34  Id. at 99. 
 35  Id. at 59. 
 36  Id. at 83. 
 37  Id. at 59, 84.  But see Michael W. McConnell, Why Protect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770 
(2013); Mark L. Rienzi, The Case for Religious Exemptions—Whether Religion Is Special or Not, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1395 (2014). 
 38  See, inter alia, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. 
L. REV. 917 (2013); Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Dilemma for 
Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15 (2013); Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal 
Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085 (2014); Schwartzman, supra note 30.  For rejoinders, see Thomas C. 
Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, and Why Religion Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 24 (2013); Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 
71 (2013). 
 39  Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 1426. 
 40  Id. at 1377, 1424, 1426. 
action . . . is one that we should reject as a threat to the very foundations of our 
constitutional order” in a pluralistic liberal democracy.41  Finally, Professor Schwartzman 
(with co-author and colleague Richard Schragger) argues that the notion that religious 
groups have special corporate autonomy is a quaint species of “neo-medieval” nostalgia 
about the “two kingdoms” of church and state and a dangerous form of “corporatist” 
pluralism that would afford free-handed “sovereignty” to other institutions besides the 
state.42  The reality is that a religious institution enjoys no more power, rights, or autonomy 
than the individuals who make it up.  A religious group has no more basis for encroaching 
on other people’s rights or freedoms than any one member of that religious group might 
have.  All this, Schwartzman concludes, might be “morally regrettable” and cause 
“intellectual ache” to religious freedom advocates, but that’s just how it is in our 
postmodern day.  Religious freedom had its special time.43  That time has passed. 
There is much more to Professor Leiter’s and Schwartzman’s arguments than this, of 
course, and there are many more such critical arguments on religious freedom now 
crowding the law review pages and library bookshelves.44  But this sampling gives a little 
flavor of critical academic opinion today.  Religious liberty is increasingly viewed as an 
impediment to progress, not a bulwark of democracy; as a shield for bigotry, not a haven 
for the unpopular; as a threat to liberalism, not a foundation of liberty.  Leading religious 
freedom scholars like Michael McConnell,45 Douglas Laycock,46 Kent Greenawalt,47 
Andrew Koppelman,48 Richard Garnett,49 Thomas Berg,50 and several others have 
parried these attacks.  But after reading all this internecine law review squabbling, Stanley 
Fish—no stranger to strong debates about fundamental matters—dismissed it all as “a 
dispiriting record of hairsplittings, pendulum swings, ad hoc acrobatics, systematic 
distortions, strained redefinitions, and just plain logical howlers.  What we have, in short, 
is the ongoing spectacle, bordering on farce, that is religion clause jurisprudence.”51 
 
 41  Id. at 1426–27. 
 42  Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 38, at 922, 930. 
 43  Schwartzman, supra note 30, at 1351–52, 1414 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1306 (1983)); see also Schragger 
& Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra note 38.  
 44  See, e.g., Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby 
Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35 (2014). 
 45  See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 37. 
 46  See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 10; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority 
Groups: A Response to NeJaime and Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 369 (2016). 
 47  See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on 
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III.     RESPONDING TO THE CRITICISMS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
We have not joined these law review debates to date, and we dip into them here with 
some hesitation since analysis and exposition have been our chosen methods of 
scholarship, not polemics and disputation.  But religious liberty is too precious and hard-
won a foundation and feature of modern democratic life to allow all these critical assaults 
to go by without comment on some of their fundamental weaknesses.  “Come now let us 
reason together,” says the ancient Prophet Isaiah—an admonition as important for 
community life today as it was in that ancient time.52 
Too many of these critical arguments trade in revisionist history that pretends that the 
American founders cared rather little about religious freedom, that the First Amendment 
was only an “afterthought” and “foreordained” to fail,53 or that principles like separation of 
church and state were really designed to protect Protestant hegemonies against surging 
Catholicism.54  The historical reality is that the founding generation spent a great deal of 
time debating and defending religious freedom for all peaceable faiths, and wove multiple 
principles of religious freedom into the new state and federal constitutions of 1776 to 
1791: notably, the principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, religious 
pluralism, religious equality, separation of church and state, and disestablishment of 
religion.55  Yes, sadly, some later Protestant majorities did abuse Catholics, Jews, 
Mormons, Native Americans, and too many others.56  But these were violations of 
constitutional freedom norms, not manifestations of their prejudicial designs—as some 
nineteenth-century cases and many more twentieth-century constitutional cases made 
abundantly clear. 
Too many of these critical arguments trade in philosophical abstractions that hover 
too high above the hard and quotidian legal questions that have occupied the Supreme 
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Court in its 230 cases on religious freedom, let alone the many thousands of lower federal 
and state court cases on point.  Academic reflections on the appropriate forms and scope 
of religious liberty, of course, are not bound by what courts have said, nor compelled to 
follow all the silly casuistry that plagues parts of the First Amendment caselaw.  But legal 
theories of religious freedom should at least deal concretely with the laws of religious 
freedom on the books and in action, offering reforms and improvements on how to apply 
them.57 
Professor Schwartzman, for example, spills a great deal of ink building up theoretical 
constructs—of “inclusive accommodation, exclusive accommodation, exclusive 
nonaccommodation, and inclusive nonaccommodation”—only to shoot them all down as 
part of his broader assault on religious freedom gone wild.58  But nowhere does he 
acknowledge that religious freedom accommodations have been part of American law 
from its colonial beginnings—think of religious oath requirements, military conscription 
laws, or property tax laws that have always included exemptions.  Nor does he 
acknowledge that religious accommodations have not proved to be the unworkable, 
unwieldy, or (as Leiter puts it) “anarchic” undermining of general laws that they are 
described to be.59  Must we dispense with all of the historic religious accommodations?  
Is the law of religious accommodations or exemptions any harder to administer than any 
other complex law in action?  Would Professor Schwartzman forbid the legislature or the 
judiciary from creating new accommodations?  On what constitutional grounds?  Nowhere 
does he acknowledge that free exercise rights or legislative accommodations do not 
protect religious activities that put others at serious risk of harm or violate others’ 
fundamental rights.  Religious exemptions create spaces for believers to exercise their 
faiths peacefully, not licenses to do harm to their neighbors or to the common good.  Even 
Hobby Lobby, the poster case for “extreme religious freedom,” went to great lengths to 
insist that the company owners’ conscientious objections to paying for certain forms of 
birth control health insurance coverage did not and could not negate a woman’s right to 
contraceptives.60  The issue in the case is who pays for the contraceptives, not whether 
a woman has a right to them.61  And nowhere does Professor Schwartzman’s attack on 
religious institutionalism address the legal reality that all manner of institutions—
corporations, labor unions, universities, charities, libraries, hospitals, and many others—
exercise power and responsibility, and enjoy rights and liberties beyond what any 
individual member of that group can muster on his or her own.62  Surely he cannot want 
us to go back to simple Lockean social contract theories of legal groups as mere voluntary 
assemblies of like-minded individuals.  Nor can he want us to revisit questions about 
corporate identity and rights that have been settled in the United States since Trustees of 
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Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819)63 and its many progeny.  If the status of group 
rights is not up for grabs, why should the legal status of religious groups be up for grabs?64  
The Western legal tradition has recognized religious group rights at least since the Edict 
of Milan in 313.65  And today every major international human rights instrument on religion 
and every liberal democracy in Europe does so, too66—even those with professed 
national policies of “secularism.”67  Why should American law now be different? 
Too many of these critical arguments trade in outmoded philosophical assumptions 
that serious public and political arguments about the fundamentals of life and the law can 
take place under the “factitious or fictitious scrim of value neutrality.”68  The reality, the 
last generation of philosophy has taught us, is that every serious position on the 
fundamental values governing public and private life—on warfare, marriage reform, 
bioethics, environmental protection, and much more—rests on a set of founding 
metaphors and starting beliefs that have comparable faith-like qualities.69  Liberalism and 
secularism are just two belief systems among many, and their public policies and 
prescriptions are enlightened, improved, and strengthened by full public engagement with 
other serious forms of faith, belief, and values.  Today, easy claims of rational neutrality 
and objectivity in public and political arguments face very strong epistemological 
headwinds.  Even the leading architects of religion-free public reason a generation or two 
ago have abandoned these views.  John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, for example, have 
affirmed in their later writings that religion can play valuable and legitimate roles in the 
lawmaking processes of liberal democracies.70  A growing number of serious political 
thinkers now acknowledge that deeply held beliefs and values, whether they issue from 
secular or religious sources, are not easily bracketed in public discourse; that efforts to 
exclude an entire class of moral and metaphysical knowledge are more likely to yield 
mutual distrust and hostility than social accord; that free speech norms do not allow the 
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prohibition of religion from the public square; and that avowedly secular values are not 
inherently more objective than their religious counterparts.71  Secular norms and idioms 
can serve as useful discursive resources in religiously pluralistic societies.  But purging 
religion altogether from public life and political deliberation, as some aggressive 
interpreters of the Establishment Clause demand, is impractical, shortsighted, and unjust. 
Too many of these critical arguments against religious liberty trade in caricatures of 
religion that bear little resemblance to reality.  Professor Leiter’s Why Tolerate Religion?, 
for example, treats religion as an irrational opiate of the masses.  Religion, he writes, by 
definition consists of categorical beliefs that “are insulated from ordinary standards of 
evidence and rational justification, the ones we employ in both common sense and in 
science.”72  Religions place “categorical demands on action . . . that must be satisfied no 
matter what an individual’s antecedent desires and no matter what incentives or 
disincentives the world offers up.”73  And religion provides mainly “existential consolation” 
about “the basic existential facts about human life, such as suffering and death.”74  Why 
should a claim or claimant that is so irrational, unscientific, categorical, abstract, and 
impervious to empirical evidence or common sense get special constitutional treatment, 
Professor Leiter asks?  Just because religion provides existential consolation?  Many 
other nonreligious things do, too.  Just because religion leads some people to do good to 
others?  People do good for all kinds of nonreligious reasons, too, and plenty of religious 
folks also do very bad things.  There’s nothing to religion that makes it more special or 
more deserving of constitutional protection than other types of thought or action, 
Professor Leiter concludes.  If anything, because religion is irrational and categorical, it 
should be subject to special supervision, not special accommodation.75 
Few people of faith, and even fewer scholars of religion, would recognize this 
caricature of religion.  For many adherents, religion consists of complex and 
comprehensive “life-worlds” (as anthropologists call them).  Religion involves daily rites 
and practices, patterns of social life and culture, and institutional structures and activities 
that collectively involve almost every dimension of an individual’s public and private life.  
Professor Leiter and many other critics of religious freedom posit a flat and anachronistic 
concept of “religion” as mere irrational belief and self-interested truth claim.  And even 
then, they pay little attention to the immense literature on philosophy of religion and 
religious epistemology, hermeneutics, theological ethics, and more, which has placed 
religious ideas and beliefs, metaphors and norms, and canons and commandments into 
complex and edifying conversations with nonreligious premises and worldviews.  It is this 
diverse and often sophisticated world of religious ideas and institutions, norms and 
practices, and cultures and communities whose freedom is at stake, not the imagined 
religious abstractions that haunt the law review world.76 
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Too many of these critical arguments trade in one-sided sociologies that dwell on the 
negatives rather than the positives of religion.  It is undeniable that religion has been, and 
still is, a formidable force for both political good and political evil, that it has fostered both 
benevolence and belligerence, and both peace and pathos of untold dimensions.  But 
when religious officials or religious group members do commit crimes—embezzling funds, 
perpetrating fraud, evading regulations, withholding medical care, betraying trust, raping 
children, abusing spouses, fomenting violence, harming the life and limb of anyone, 
including their own members—they are and should be prosecuted just like everyone else.  
Religious freedom does not and should not provide protections or pretexts for crime.  But 
the grim reality is that these crimes occur in every organization, and are perpetrated by 
all manner of people, religious and nonreligious alike.  That these abuses must be rooted 
out, however, does not mean that the perpetrator’s individual or corporate rights must end 
as a consequence.  Governments do not close down schools, libraries, clubs, charities, 
or corporations when a few of their members commit these crimes.  They prosecute the 
criminals, following the norms of due process.  The same should take place in our 
churches, synagogues, temples, and mosques that harbor criminal suspects. 
Moreover, we would do well to remember the immensely valuable goods that religion 
offers to a community.  America’s leading religious historian, Martin E. Marty, has 
documented the private and public goods of religion over a sixty-year career.  Religions, 
he shows, deal uniquely with the deepest elements of individual and social life.  Religions 
catalyze social, intellectual, and material exchanges among citizens.  Religions trigger 
economic, charitable, and educational impulses in citizens.  Religions provide valuable 
checks and counterpoints to social and individual excess.  Religions help diffuse social 
and political crises and absolutisms by relativizing everyday life and its institutions.  
Religions provide prophecy, criticism, and exemplars for society.  Religions force others 
to examine their presuppositions.  Religions are distinct repositories of tradition, wisdom, 
and perspective.  Religions counsel against apathy.  Religions often represent practiced 
and durable sources and forms of community.  Religions provide leadership and hope, 
especially in times of individual and social crisis.  Religions contribute to the theory and 
practice of the common good.  Religions represent the unrepresented, teach stewardship 
and preservation, provide fresh starts for the desperate, and exalt the dignity and freedom 
of the individual.77  No religion lives up to all these claims all the time; some religions 
never do.  But these common qualities and contributions have long been among the 
reasons to support the special place of religion in the American constitutional and cultural 
order.78 
Finally, too many of these critical arguments fail to appreciate how dearly fought 
religious freedom has been in the history of humankind, how imperiled religious freedom 
has become in many parts of the world today, and how indispensable religious freedom 
has proved to be for the protection of other fundamental human rights in modern 
democracies.79  Even in postmodern liberal societies, religions help to define the 
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meanings and measures of shame and regret, restraint and respect, and responsibility 
and restitution that a human rights regime presupposes.  Religions help to lay out the 
fundamentals of human dignity and human community, and the essentials of human 
nature and human needs upon which human rights norms and instruments are built.  
Moreover, religions stand alongside the state and other institutions in helping to 
implement and protect the rights of a person and community—especially at times when 
the state becomes weak, distracted, divided, cash-strapped, corrupt, or is in transition.  
Religious communities can create the conditions (sometimes the prototypes) for the 
realization of civil and political rights of speech, press, assembly, and more.  They can 
provide a critical (sometimes the principal) means of education, healthcare, childcare, 
labor organizations, employment, and artistic opportunities, among other things.  And they 
can offer some of the deepest insights into the duties of stewardship and service that lie 
at the heart of environmental rights and protection. 
Because of the vital role of religion in the cultivation and implementation of other 
human rights, many social scientists and human rights scholars have come to see that 
providing strong protections for religious beliefs, practices, and institutions enhances, 
rather than diminishes, human rights for all.80  Many scholars now repeat the American 
founders’ insight that religious freedom is “the first freedom” from which other rights and 
freedoms evolve.81  For the religious individual, the right to believe often correlates with 
freedoms to assemble, speak, worship, evangelize, educate, parent, travel, or to abstain 
from the same on the basis of one’s beliefs.  For the religious association, the right to 
practice religion collectively implicates rights to corporate property, collective worship, 
organized charity, religious education, freedom of press, and autonomy of governance.  
Several detailed studies have shown that the protection of “religious freedom in a country 
is strongly associated with other freedoms, including civil and political liberty, press 
freedom, and economic freedom, as well as with multiple measures of well-being”—less 
warfare and violence, better healthcare, higher levels of income, and better educational 
and social opportunities, especially for women, children, the disabled, and the poor.82 
By contrast, where religious freedom is low, communities tend to suffer and struggle.  
A comprehensive 2009 study, updated in 2016, documented that more than a third of the 
world’s 198 countries and self-administering territories had “high” or “very high” levels of 
religious oppression, sometimes exacerbated by civil wars, natural disasters, and foreign 
invasions that have caused massive humanitarian crises.  The countries on this dishonor 
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roll include Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Somalia, Yemen, Sudan, South Sudan, Egypt, Israel, Burma, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, 
Chechnya, and Uzbekistan, among others.83  A recent annual report of the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom confirms the precarious status of 
religious minorities in many parts of the world, now exacerbated by the rise of ISIS in the 
Middle East and the escalating oppression of Muslim and Christian minorities in various 
parts of the world.84  A 2014 study found that Christians, in fact, were more widely 
harassed than any other religious group, experiencing social and political hostility in at 
least 110 countries.85  These hostilities against religious believers are carried out by a 
wide range of private groups and governmental entities.  They include arrests and 
detentions; desecration of holy sites, books, and objects; denial of visas, corporate 
charters, and entity status; discrimination in employment, education, and housing; 
closures of worship centers, schools, charities, cemeteries, and religious services; and 
worse: rape, torture, kidnappings, beheadings, and the genocidal slaughter of religious 
believers in alarming numbers in war-torn areas of the Middle East and Africa.86  In light 
of these grim global realities, those who argue that American religious freedom is a 
dispensable cultural luxury would do well to direct their formidable talents to more 
constructive agendas. 
IV.     RESTORING AMERICA’S ENDURING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PRINCIPLES 
So, where do we go from here?  We suggest looking back to the wisdom of the 
American founders and using their enduring insights to appreciate what it is at stake in 
the modern culture wars over religious freedom, at home and abroad. 
Let’s let John Adams, Massachusetts jurist, constitutional framer, and future 
American president be our guide in the brief look backward.  Writing in the context of the 
United States Constitutional Convention of 1787, Adams offered a robust appraisal of the 
new American experiment: 
The people in America have now the best opportunity and the greatest trust in 
their hands, that Providence ever committed to so small a number, since the 
transgression of the first pair [Adam and Eve]; if they betray their trust, their guilt 
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will merit even greater punishment than other nations have suffered, and the 
indignation of Heaven. . . . 
. . . . 
     The United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first example of 
governments erected on the simple principles of nature; and if men are now 
sufficiently enlightened to disabuse themselves of artifice, imposture, hypocrisy, 
and superstition, they will consider this event as [a new] era in their history.  
Although the detail of the formation of the American governments is at present 
little known or regarded either in Europe or in America, it may hereafter become 
an object of curiosity. . . . [For it is] destined to spread over the northern part 
of . . . the globe . . . . 
. . . . 
     The institutions now made in America will not wholly wear out for thousands 
of years.  It is of the last importance, then, that they should begin right.  If they 
set out wrong, they will never be able to return, unless it be by accident, to the 
right path.87 
For Adams, this was a “trust of the greatest magnitude . . . and the eyes of the world are 
upon [us.]”88 
More than two centuries later, Adams’s sentiments prove remarkably prescient.  For 
all of their failures and shortcomings, the eighteenth-century founders did indeed begin 
on the right “path” toward a free society, and today, Americans enjoy a good deal of 
religious, civil, and political freedom as a consequence.  American principles of religious 
freedom have had a profound influence around the globe, and they now figure 
prominently in a number of national constitutions and international human rights 
instruments issued by political and religious bodies.89 
To be sure, as Adams predicted, there has always been a “glorious uncertainty of the 
law” of religious liberty and a noble diversity of understandings of its details.90  This was 
as true in Adams’s day as in our own.  In Adams’s day, there were competing models of 
religious liberty that were more overtly theological than his—whether Puritan, Evangelical, 
Catholic, Quaker, or Anglican in inspiration.  There were also competing models that were 
more overtly philosophical than his—whether Neoclassical, Republican, Whig, or Liberal 
in inclination.91  Today, these and other founding models of religious liberty have born 
ample progeny, and the great rivalries among them are fought out in the courts, 
legislatures, and academies throughout the land and, increasingly, the world. 
Prone as he was to a dialectical model of religious liberty, Adams would likely approve 
of our rigorous rivalries of principle—so long as the rivals themselves remain committed 
to constitutional ideals of democratic order, rule of law, and ordered liberty for all.  But 
Adams would also likely insist that we reconsider his most cardinal insights about the 
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necessary dialectical nature of religious freedom and religious establishment.  Too little 
religious freedom, Adams insisted, is a recipe for hypocrisy and impiety.  But too unbridled 
religious freedom is an invitation to license and criminality.  Too firm a religious 
establishment breeds coercion and corruption.  But too little concern for religion allows 
anti-religious prejudices to become constitutional prerogatives.  Somewhere between 
these extremes, Adams believed, a society must find its balance.92 
One key to re-striking this constitutional balance today lies in the eighteenth-century 
founders’ most elementary insight—that religion is special and needs special protection 
in the Constitution.  “[W]e cannot repudiate that decision without rejecting an essential 
feature of constitutionalism, rendering all constitutional rights vulnerable to repudiation if 
they go out of favor,” writes Douglas Laycock.93  Although America’s religious landscape 
has changed, religion remains today a unique source of individual and personal identity 
for many, involving “the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging 
it,” in James Madison’s words.94  The founders’ vision was that religion is more than simply 
another form of speech and assembly, privacy and autonomy; it deserves separate 
constitutional treatment.  The founders thus placed freedom of religion alongside 
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, giving religious claimants special protection 
and restricting government in its interaction with religion.  Religion is also a unique form 
of public and social identity, involving a vast plurality of sanctuaries, schools, charities, 
missions, and other forms and forums of faith.  All peaceable exercises of religion, 
whether individual or corporate, private or public, properly deserve the protection of the 
First Amendment.  And such protection sometimes requires special exemptions and 
accommodations that cannot be afforded by general laws.95  “The tyranny of the majority,” 
Madison reminds us, is particularly dangerous to religious minorities.96 
A second key to re-striking this constitutional balance lies in the eighteenth-century 
founders’ insight that to be enduring and effective, the constitutional process must seek 
to involve all voices and values in the community—religious, nonreligious, and anti-
religious alike.  Healthy constitutionalism ultimately demands “confident pluralism”97—in 
John Inazu’s apt phrase.  Thus in creating the new American constitutions, the framers 
drew upon all manner of representatives and voters to create and ratify these new organic 
laws.  Believers and skeptics, churchmen and statesmen, Protestants and Catholics, 
Quakers and Jews, Civic Republicans and Enlightenment Liberals—many of whom had 
slandered if not slaughtered each other with a vengeance in years past—now came 
together in a rare moment of constitutional solidarity.  The founders understood that a 
proper law of religious liberty required that all peaceable religions and believers 
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participate in both its creation and its unfolding.  To be sure, both in the founders’ day and 
in subsequent generations, some Americans showed little concern for the religious or civil 
rights of Jews, Catholics, Mormons, Native Americans, Asian Americans, or African 
Americans, and too often inflicted horrible abuses upon them.  And today, some of these 
old prejudices are returning anew in bitter clashes over race, immigration, and refugees, 
and in fresh outbreaks of nativism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.  But a generous 
willingness to embrace all peaceable religions in the great project of religious freedom is 
one of the most original and compelling insights of the American experiment.  As John 
Adams put it, religious freedom “resides in Hindoos and Mahometans, as well as in 
Christians; in Cappadocian monarchists, as well as in Athenian democrats; in Shaking 
Quakers, as well as in . . . Presbyterian clergy; in Tartars and Arabs, Negroes and 
Indians”—indeed in “[all] the people of the United States.”98 
A third key to re-striking this constitutional balance lies in balancing the multiple 
principles of religious liberty that the founders set forth in the frugal, sixteen-word phrase, 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof.”99  The founders designed the First Amendment religion clauses as 
twin guarantees of religious liberty for all.  The Free Exercise Clause outlaws government 
proscriptions of religion—actions that unduly burden the conscience, restrict religious 
expression and activity, discriminate against religion, or invade the autonomy of churches 
and other religious bodies.  The Establishment Clause outlaws government prescriptions 
of religion—actions that unduly coerce the conscience, mandate forms of religious 
expression and activity, discriminate in favor of religion, or improperly ally the state with 
churches or other religious bodies.  The First Amendment guarantees of no establishment 
and free exercise of religion thereby provided complementary protections to the other 
constitutive principles of the American experiment—liberty of conscience, religious 
equality, religious pluralism, and separation of church and state.100 
These three insights were not only part of the original vision of the eighteenth-century 
founders; they were also part of the original vision of the Supreme Court as it created the 
modern constitutional law of religious freedom.  All three of these insights recur in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940)101 and in Everson v. Board of Education (1947),102 the two 
landmark cases that first applied the First Amendment religion clauses to the states and 
inaugurated the modern era of religious liberty in America. 
Cantwell and Everson declared anew that religion had a special place in the 
Constitution and deserved special protection in the nation.  In a remarkable counter-
textual reading, the Court took it upon itself and the federal judiciary to enforce the First 
Amendment religion clauses against all levels and branches of government in the nation.  
By incorporating the First Amendment religion clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, the Court created a common and special law of religious liberty for 
the whole nation.  “Congress shall make no law” now became, in effect, “Government 
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shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.” 
Cantwell and Everson also declared anew that all religious voices were welcome in 
the modern constitutional process of protecting religious liberty.  These two cases 
welcomed hitherto marginal voices: Cantwell welcomed a devout Jehovah’s Witness who 
sought protections for his very unpopular missionary work.  Everson welcomed a skeptical 
citizen who sought protection from paying taxes in support of religious education.  
Subsequent cases have drawn into the constitutional dialogue a host of other religious 
and anti-religious groups—Catholics, Protestants, and Orthodox Christians; Jews, 
Muslims, and Hindus; Mormons, Quakers, and Hare Krishnas; Wiccans, Santerians, and 
Summumites; Skeptics, Atheists, and Secularists. 
And Cantwell and Everson declared anew the efficacy of the founding principles of 
the American experiment in religious freedom.  The Free Exercise Clause, the Cantwell 
Court proclaimed, protects “[f]reedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such 
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose.”103  It “safeguards 
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion,” the “freedom to act” on one’s beliefs.104  
It protects a plurality of forms and expressions of faith, each of which deserves equal 
protection under the law.  “The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under 
their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop unmolested and 
unobstructed.”105  The Establishment Clause, the Everson Court echoed, means that no 
government “can set up a church”; “can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain 
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any 
religion”; can “punish[] [a person] for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance”; “can, openly or secretly, participate 
in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”106  Government 
may not “exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, 
Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of 
their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation” or 
participating in the American public arena or political process.107  Such was the original 
vision of the founders in the eighteenth century and of the Supreme Court at the start of 
the modern era of religious liberty in the 1940s.108 
We need another landmark case or two to retrieve and reanimate these fundamental 
principles of religious freedom.  The weakening of the First Amendment religion clauses 
in Supreme Court cases since the mid-1980s has placed too much discretionary power 
in the hands of the legislature and the states.  Such a shift leaves what should be common 
national rights of religious liberty too vulnerable to fleeting political fashions and too 
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contingent on a claimant’s geographical location.  The federal courts should provide 
common and firm religious liberty protections for all parties, no matter where those parties 
happen to reside or where they choose to file their lawsuits.  This need for a strong 
common national law on religious liberty, in the face of grim bigotry at home and religious 
persecution abroad, was among the compelling reasons that led the Supreme Court in 
the 1940s to “incorporate” the First Amendment religion clauses into the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause and make them binding on state and local 
governments.109  It was also the reason that America and the world embraced religious 
freedom in the 1940s as a universal and non-derogable human right—one of the famous 
“four freedoms” that President Roosevelt championed to rebuke the horrific abuses 
inflicted on Jews and others during World War II.110  This vision of a strong federal 
constitutional law of religious liberty remains essential for America, and the federal courts 
are still in the best position to enforce this law.  Strong new statutes protecting religious 
freedom are welcome additions, but strong constitutional norms, enforced by the federal 
courts, are an essential core of American religious liberty. 
Constitutions work like “clock[s],” John Adams reminds us.  Certain parts of them are 
“essentials and fundamentals,” and, to operate properly, their pendulums must swing 
back and forth and their operators must get wound up from time to time.111  Robust 
religious freedom is one of the “fundamentals” of our constitutional structure—and we 
have certainly seen plenty of constitutional operators get wound up of late about religious 
liberty and wide pendular swings in First Amendment jurisprudence.  But despite the loud 
criticisms from the academy, we may well have come to the end of a long constitutional 
swing of cases away from religious liberty protection from 1985 to 2010, and are now 
witnessing the start of a pendular swing back in favor of stronger religious freedom 
protection.  Since 2011, the last seven Supreme Court cases on religious freedom have 
all been wins for religion: Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn,112 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,113 Town of Greece v. 
Galloway,114 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,115 Holt v. Hobbs,116 Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert,117 and Zubik v. Burwell.118  And there have been parallel religious freedom 
victories in the European Court of Human Rights in recent years.119 
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Moreover, and more gravely, the blood of the many thousands of religious martyrs, 
especially in the genocidal attacks on communities of faith in the Middle East, Central 
Africa, and Central Eurasia, is now crying out so loudly that the world community will have 
to move toward concerted action in protection of religious freedom.  As in Adams’s day, 
so in our own, the United States remains positioned to take the global lead on this effort.  
Most of the core principles of religious freedom—liberty of conscience, freedom of 
exercise, religious equality and pluralism, and separation of church and state, or religion 
and government—forged in the course of the American constitutional experiment are now 
at the heart of the international human rights protections.  And the work of our 
constitutional courts remains the envy of the world, even if individual cases are 
denounced. 
It is essential, in our view, that these core principles of religious freedom remain vital 
parts of our American constitutional life and are not diluted into neutrality or equality norms 
alone, and not weakened by too low a standard of review or too high a law of standing.  
It is essential that we address the glaring blind spots in our religious liberty 
jurisprudence—particularly the long and shameful treatment of Native American Indian 
claims120 and the growing repression of Muslims and other minorities at the local level, 
which are not being addressed very well.121  It is essential that we show our traditional 
hospitality and charity to the “sojourner[s] who [are] within [our] gates”122—migrants, 
refugees, asylum seekers, and others—and desist from some of the outrageous nativism 
and xenophobia that have marked too much of our popular and political speech of late.123  
It is essential that we balance religious freedom with other fundamental freedoms, 
including sexual and same-sex freedoms, and find responsible ways of living together 
with all our neighbors, and desisting from mutually destructive strategies of defaming, 
demonizing, and destroying those who hold other viewpoints.  And it is essential that we 
make our landmark International Religious Freedom Act124 a strong focus of our 
international diplomacy and policy again, not something to be ignored when economic, 
military, or geo-political interests get in the way, or deprecated and underfunded when 
other special administration interests gain political favor.125  Now is the time for American 
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governments, academics, NGOs, religious and political groups, and citizens alike to stand 
for strong religious freedom at home and abroad, for all peaceable people of faith. 
Religion is too vital a root and resource for democratic order and rule of law to be 
passed over or pushed out.  Religious freedom is too central a pillar of liberty and human 
rights to be chiseled away or pulled down.  In centuries past—and in many regions of the 
world still today—disputes over religion and religious freedom have often led to violence, 
and sometimes to all-out warfare.  We have the extraordinary luxury in America of settling 
our religious disputes and vindicating our religious rights with patience, deliberation, due 
process, and full ventilation of the issues on all sides.  We would do well to continue to 
embrace this precious constitutional heritage and process, and help others to achieve the 
same.  As John Adams reminds us: “[T]he eyes of the world are upon [us].”126 
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